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Abstract
Upon discussion of price setting on electricity wholesale markets, many refer
to the so-called merit order model. Conventional wisdom holds that during
most hours of the year, coal- or natural gas-fired power plants set the price
on European markets. In this context, this paper analyses price setting on
European power markets. We use a fundamental electricity market model of
interconnected bidding zones to determine hourly price-setting technologies
for the year 2020. We find a price-setting pattern that is more complex and
nuanced than the conventional wisdom suggests: across all researched
countries, coal- and natural gas-fired power plants set the price for only 40
per cent of all hours. Other power generation technologies such as wind,
biomass, hydro and nuclear power plants as well as lignite-fired plants set the
price during the rest of the year. On some markets, the price setting is
characterised by a high level of interconnectivity and thus foreign influence –
as illustrated by the example of the Netherlands. During some 75 per cent of
hours, foreign power plants set the price on the Dutch market, whilst price
setting in other more isolated markets is barely affected by foreign markets.
Hence, applying the price setting analysis to the proposed Dutch carbon price
floor, we show that different carbon prices have little effect on the
technological structure of the price-setting units. In this respect, the impacts
of the unilateral initiative are limited. There are, however, considerable
changes to be observed in wholesale power prices, import/export balances as
well as production volumes and subsequent CO2 outputs of lignite-, coal- and
gas-fired power plants.
Key words: Price setting, electricity markets, merit order, generation technologies, carbon
price floor

1. Introduction
Wholesale power markets follow the principle of short-run electricity markets where the
market clearing price is determined by the intersection of supply and demand at any given
hour. In theory, the resulting hourly day-ahead market price is equal to the marginal costs of
the last (marginal) unit in the merit order necessary to satisfy the demand. Given that this
marginal unit sets the price for all power generation units operating during that particular
hour, one can refer to this as ‘price setting’.

1
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2018

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1259 [2018]

It is frequently stated that in most central European markets, gas- and/or coal-fired power
plants are usually the marginal price-setting units (Finon, 2013, pp. 133–134; Geiger, 2011, p.
20; Genoese et al., 2015, pp. 176–177; Pietroni, 2017, p. 1). Geiger, for instance, notes with
respect to the German power market that “the price setting unit is often either a gas or a coal
plant” (Geiger, 2011, p. 20). Also concerning the German market, Genoese and Egenhofer
conclude that “it is safe to assume that gas was the price-setting technology in most hours”
when analysing the comparably high prices of 2008 (Genoese et al., 2015, p. 177). Researching
the British market, Roques et. al. state that “gas-fired plants were often the marginal pricesetting plants in the British electricity market” (Roques et al., 2008, p. 1841). But is it safe to
assume this? Is it still valid at present? And on what basis is this conventional wisdom
accepted?
There are well founded reasons for this general idea. First, one can point towards the nature
of European power plant portfolios with significant coal- and gas-fired generation capacities
and their marginal pricing. Second, it should be noted that causal relationships between coal
and/or gas prices and wholesale power prices have indeed been observed and documented
(Emery and Liu, 2002; Ferkingstad et al., 2011; Mohammadi, 2009; Moutinho et al., 2011;
Roques et al., 2008). Beyond this research on the relationship between fuel and power prices,
there is to our knowledge no academic literature that looks in detail into the actual price
setting on European markets and the question to what extent coal- and gas-fired power plants
are indeed commonly price-setting.
This paper aims to fill this gap and investigate the price setting on European power wholesale
markets using a fundamental electricity market model. From the hourly calculations of
European power markets, one can derive the marginal price-setting technology for any given
hour. Taking a whole year as a timeframe, it is possible to analyse how the hours of a year are
structured and what share different generation technologies take in providing the marginal
price-setting units. The core objective is to broaden the knowledge on the price setting on
European power markets and get a more nuanced picture on what technologies set market
prices. Given that the European power market is integrated and significant cross-border flows
are taking place, the analysis is not limited to one country but looks at twenty integrated
central European power markets1. This will help to understand interdependencies and in
what ways larger markets dominate price setting elsewhere.
This framework can then be used to research a whole range of developments to see how
certain changes in the market affect the price setting. There are many possible ‘sensitivities’
one can employ here; such as fuel price changes, interconnector capacity changes, power
plant portfolio changes, etc. In view of ongoing public debates on CO2 price floors and the
announcement of the Dutch government to introduce one, the authors have chosen to
analyse how different CO2 price floors affect the price setting on those markets. This will shed
light on the question how carbon price floors influence marginal price setting and if a given
price floor will cause in a shift from coal to gas as a dominant price-setting technology.

1

The twenty modelled countries are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
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To this end, the paper first discusses the general approach to price setting on European power
markets and the existing literature and research. This is followed by a description of the
applied methodology with regards to the employed model and carbon price floors.
Afterwards, the results are presented, analysed and discussed. First in the light of price setting
across borders, second with respect to the different price-setting technologies and then
sorted in three price level. Last but not least, the paper looks at the employed carbon price
floors before concluding.

2. Price setting general approach
As aforementioned, conventional wisdom holds that gas- and/or coal-fired power plants are
the price-setting marginal units in different central European countries for most hours of the
year. This seems reasonable given the substantial capacities of gas- and/or coal-fired
generation capacities in many countries and their marginal pricing. The marginal costs of coaland gas-fired power plants fall within the commonly observed range of wholesale power
prices. Other generation technologies such as nuclear power or renewable energy sources
are characterised either by very low marginal costs or, in the case of peak generation units
like oil or diesel generators, by very high marginal costs. Therefore, unless power prices are
at any given moment extraordinary high or low, one can assume that these technologies do
not provide the marginal price-setting units.
It should be noted at this point that European wholesale power prices have experienced a
significant drop within the last several years, and that the number of hours in a year with very
low prices increased significantly (Everts et al., 2016; Hirth, 2018). It therefore seems plausible
that during those low-priced hours, inflexible low-marginal cost generation technologies such
as lignite, nuclear power or must-run technologies are indeed providing the last marginal unit
on the merit order to meet the load – and are thus price-setting.
A look at the merit order can help to take further the idea of substantial coal- and gas-fired
power plant capacities and their marginal pricing. Figure 1 displays an approximated example
of a merit order in Germany. The line shows the German residual load of the year 2017 in
1,000 Megawatt (MW) brackets. The residual load is commonly defined as the difference
between actual power demand and the non-dispatchable stochastic power generation of
photovoltaics and wind turbines (Schill, 2014, p. 65). Other generation technologies (in this
case predominantly thermal ones) are therefore those covering the residual load. The
distribution of the residual load over the merit order curve shows which generation
technology should, in theory, set the price at a given residual load. Following this principle,
lignite and hard coal power plants should be the price-setting units during most hours of the
year, whilst gas-fired power plants alongside biomass and nuclear power plants take a smaller
share.

3
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Figure 1: Approximated 2017 German merit-order and residual load (as probability density function) 2. At 100 per cent
power plant availability, lignite- and coal-fired power plants seem to set the price for the majority of hours.

One should note at this point that the unavailability of power plants – for instance due to
revisions, maintenance and naturally occurring lower capacity factors of run-of-river and
biomass power plants – are disregarded in this visualisation. Taking these factors into account
would shift the merit order curve to the left and increase the hours in a year during which
gas-fired power plants should provide the marginal units. In addition to the unavailability of
power plants, this merit order and residual load-based view of the price setting concept also
disregards cross-border flows, i.e. electricity imports and exports. These drawbacks
demonstrate why this approach is not the most accurate way of looking at the concept of
marginal units and price-setting technologies, but it can help to understand where the
conventional wisdom or usual narrative might originate from.
Numerous scholars have researched price dynamics between gas or coal prices and power
prices in different countries. Emery and Liu analyse the relationship between electricity
futures prices and gas futures prices and find that they are co-integrated (Emery and Liu,
2002). Mohammadi finds a stable long-run relation between real prices for power and coal
and insignificant long-run relations between power and gas prices (Mohammadi, 2009).
Ferkingstad et al. research the interplay of different fuel and electricity prices in the Nordic
and German markets and find a strong connection between gas and electricity prices yet no
significant connection between electricity and coal prices (Ferkingstad et al., 2011). Moutinho
et al. observe inter alia a positive correlation between gas and electricity prices on the Spanish
market (Moutinho et al., 2011, pp. 5905–5907). Roques et al. analyse the correlation between
electricity and gas prices in Britain with respect to portfolio optimisation for generators and
calls for further research in the area, especially in regard to effects of carbon emission
allowances on the marginal technology in the market (Roques et al., 2008).
Even though the findings of scholars differ with different methodologies and research
focuses, it can be noted that causal relationships between gas and/or coal prices and power
2

Marginal costs are based on authors’ estimations. Residual load and capacity data from Bundesnetzagentur |
SMARD.de (Bundesnetzagentur, 2018).
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prices exist, depending on the researched countries, time frames, applied methodologies and
so forth.
In terms of price setting, reservoirs or storage plants, as well has pumped-hydro storage
plants, serve a special role. Reservoirs and hydro-storage plants have effectively very low
marginal costs and are, however, often the last marginal unit to satisfy demand. Given that
those plants have only a limited amount of water that can be discharged within a year, the
usage hours are optimised to serve the highest priced hours. Economists mention that the
opportunity costs of releasing water are equal to the expected future value of electricity
produced when referring to this non-marginal costs-based dispatch (Faria and Fleten, 2011,
p. 83; Pikk and Viiding, 2013, p. 52). With regards to hydro-storage plants or pumped-hydro
storage plants, the term ‘price setting’ can thus be misleading since shadow prices – reflecting
the marginal costs of additional alternative (thermal) power plants – are used for the
dispatch. The shadow prices thereby relate to the costs of a thermal reference power plant,
and the historic monthly water levels of reservoirs are used for modelling the dispatch of
reservoirs and pumped-hydro power plants.

3. Methodology
3.1 Model

The techno-economic model Green-X3 is used to model the European power market. The
modelling process incorporates the dispatch and investment in power plants, minimisation of
total investment costs as well as production and trade decisions, all with a range of technical
constraints. In economic terms, the model is a partial equilibrium model of wholesale
electricity markets, focussing on the supply side. It includes an up-to-date power plant
database4 of all twenty countries including plants that are planned or set to be
decommissioned, as well as an up-to-date database of all interconnectors among those
countries.
Aside from the Green-X model power plant database – including planned plants and those
under construction –, the model also adds further capacities endogenously. Although
endogenous conventional capacity additions are limited given the relatively short time
horizon of this research, they take an important role in longer-term modelling. The
endogenous capacity additions are based on economic criteria with support schemes and
political frameworks taken into account, which is especially important for renewable
technologies, and first and foremost wind and photovoltaics.
3

Green-X is a fundamental power model covering the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU) and
selected EU neighbouring countries. It allows for the investigation of future deployments in the power and
renewable sector including accompanying costs and benefits. It enables the derivation of a detailed
quantitative assessment of renewable electricity sources deployed in a real-world policy context on a national
and European level for the power, heat and transport sectors. It has been successfully applied for the
European Commission within several tenders and research projects to assess the feasibility of ‘20% renewable
electricity sources by 2020’ and for assessments of its developments beyond that time horizon. In addition,
Green-X can be used for a detailed quantitative assessment of the hourly market prices of the European power
markets (Everts et al., 2016; Huber, 2004).
4
Small-scale plants and non-hydro renewables are grouped into clusters.
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The actual modelling can be described as a three-level process. In a first step, the endogenous
and exogenous capacity additions/deductions (the latter from the aforementioned power
plant database) are determined. The second step consists of computing the hourly power
plant dispatch based on the determined power plant portfolio (taking into consideration
interconnector capacities, power plant availability and power demand). A marginal costbased merit order curve determines the marginal power plants for every hour in addition to
country-specific power prices. The third step examines the economic viability of new power
plants and calculates final market prices. For the latter, the model also estimates incomes
from ancillary services based on information provided by TSOs regarding historic ancillary
services.

3.2 Price-setting technologies
The model was calibrated in a way to most accurately represent the current European power
market and replicate hourly day ahead prices on the power exchanges. The year 2020 was
chosen as a reference year as it is the year the Dutch carbon price is supposed to come into
effect. This comparable near future horizon allows for using real future market prices for most
primary energy sources that were taken from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) at the time
of the modelling (Spring 2018).
Other primary energy sources such as lignite, uranium or biomass have no available and
suitable real future market prices, which is why they had to be estimated based on available
data and scientific studies. Lignite and biomass prices are therefore country specific and
remain, just like uranium prices, constant within the analysed year of 2020.
For transfer capacities between countries, the model uses current data and planned additions
from the European network of transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E).
Within countries the model assumes that no congestions exist. The power demand is
determined first and foremost by gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the individual countries’ power consumption per unit of GDP. To
model yearly power demand, historic GDP and power consumption data of different
providers are used for an accurate calibration. The influence of energy policies on power
consumption such as increases and reductions in demand through the deployment of electric
vehicles or energy saving measures is taken into account, yet due to the short time horizon in
question this influence is rather limited. For the modelling of the hourly demand, the model
uses load profiles from the year 2009, whereby changes in consumption behaviour are
considered. In order to simulate the production of renewable technologies such as hydro
power plants, photovoltaics and wind turbines (that are heavily dependent on meteorological
conditions), hydrological conditions, solar radiation and wind speeds from the same year
(2009) were used (since 2009 represents a somewhat typical meteorological year).

3.3 Carbon price floors
Ceteris paribus, carbon prices were changed once to 18€/tCO2 for the Netherlands to simulate
the announced carbon price floor, and once to 30€/tCO2 for Austria, the Benelux countries,
France, Germany and Switzerland to simulate the concept of a common carbon price floor.
The floor price of 18 or 30€/tCO2 thereby includes the EU ETS allowance price and is not to
be understood as a top-up or premium.
6
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The corresponding CO2 emissions of the different scenarios are derived from the calculated
hourly power plant dispatch. The emissions of the different power plants are hereby limited
to CO2 emissions. Other greenhouse gas emissions such as methane (CH4) or nitrous oxide
(N2O) are not taken into account.

4. Modelling results
4.1 Price setting across borders
There exists the key question of how the modelling results compare with the conventional
wisdom. A first observation is that, with respect to the marginal price-setting units, the
modelling results indicate a higher level of interconnectivity than one may assume. Large
countries tend to dominate the price setting – presumably simply due to the large number of
power plants and their differentiated marginal costs. Small countries such as Luxembourg
only provide the price-setting marginal units for few hours a year and are to a great extent
influenced by their neighbouring countries. Relative size, i.e. the size in relation to
neighbours, also matters in this context. Hence, electricity markets and wholesale power
prices of comparably small countries are significantly influenced by the energy policies of their
larger neighbours. Indeed, the modelling results show that in terms of price setting, foreign
energy policies can have a larger influence on a given state’s electricity market than domestic
policies.

Figure 2: Price-setting technologies Netherlands 2020 in hours per year. Price setting in the Netherlands shows a substantial
foreign influence.

7
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Figure 2 shows the structure of the price-setting units in the Netherlands for the year 2020.
The bar on the left illustrates the amount of hours different technologies provide the pricesetting units. The other bars show the countries where those price-setting units are location
(Netherlands, Germany, France, Great Britain and other countries combined). Gas-fired
power plants represent the most dominant price-setting technology and for most hours of
the year, foreign power plants set the price in the Netherlands. One can therefore surmise
that foreign markets and thus foreign energy policies influence the Dutch power market
considerably.
A closer look at the German price setting (Figure 3) reveals that this is not merely a Dutch or
small-state phenomenon given that the German market represents the largest European
market.

Figure 3: Price-setting technologies Germany 2020 in hours per year. Price setting in Germany is heavily linked with foreign
markets despite the considerable size of the domestic market.

Other more isolated markets such as Great Britain are only marginally influenced by crossborder flows due to rather limited net transfer capacities. The Spanish and Portuguese
markets on the Iberian Peninsula are also barely affected by outside markets in terms of price
setting (see Figure 4).

8
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Figure 4: Price-setting technologies Spain 2020 in hours per year. Price setting in Spain shows little foreign influence.

As a general observation, the number of total hours power plants from a given country are
price setting is highest in that given country, i.e. plants from country X do not provide as many
price-setting hours in any other country as they do in country X.

4.2 Price-setting technologies
Looking at the technologies that provide the marginal price-setting units, one can confirm
aforementioned presumptions. For the large majority (>90%) of total hours in all countries,
reservoirs, pumped-hydro, nuclear, gas-, coal- and lignite-fired power plants provide the
marginal price-setting units. Other technologies such as stochastic renewables or other fossil
plants play an almost negligible role in terms of price setting. This seems plausible given the
very low marginal cost of renewable energies and their subsequent position at the starting
point of the merit order. During most hours, further power plants are necessary to satisfy the
demand.
Altogether, the modelling results show that gas-fired power plants provide the price-setting
units for almost a third of the total hours and thus for more hours than any other generation
technology. Coal- and lignite-fired power plants follow, and together provide the price-setting
units for over a quarter of the total hours (whereby lignite-fired power plants take a larger
share than coal-fired ones). A notable point is that reservoirs and pumped-hydro power plants
are also price setting for another quarter of the total hours. Nuclear power plants set the
price for just below 10 percent of the hours, a share similar to that of renewables, including
run-of-river power plants (see Figure 5).

9
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Figure 5: Price-setting technologies of all researched countries 2020 in per cent.

On an individual country basis, the picture of price-setting technologies can look very
different depending on the countries’ – and connected, surrounding countries’ – generation
portfolio(s). Here one can observe some expected outcomes. The price setting in Poland, for
instance, is dominated by lignite- and coal-fired power plants whereas in Great Britain, Italy
and on the Iberian Peninsula, gas-fired power plants provide the price-setting units for the
most hours. Similarly, Norwegian reservoirs as well as Finnish and Swedish nuclear power
plants share the price-setting hours in the three states, which generally have a similar picture
in terms of the price-setting units. This can be seen as an indicator of similar production parks,
a high level of interconnectivity, or indeed a combination of both.

4.3 High vs low priced hours
In order to evaluate the modelling results further, one can divide the hours in a year into
different groups. Therefore, the 8,784 hours of the year 2020 were divided into the highest,
medium and lowest priced hours per country.

10
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Figure 6: Price-setting technologies of the lowest priced tercile in per cent

The price setting of the lowest priced tercile is as one might expect; characterised by low
marginal cost technologies. Hence, nuclear is the technology that sets the price for most
hours in the lowest priced tercile with almost a quarter of the total hours. Indeed, the hours
during which very low marginal cost technologies such as nuclear, stochastic renewables and
run-of-river power plants set the price are almost exclusively found in the lowest priced third
of the total hours. Of interest here is the observation that coal-fired power plants provide
almost no price-setting units in this low-price segment. In contrast, lignite-fired power plants
set the price for a fifth of the hours in this segment. It may come as a surprise that, according
to the results of the model, gas-fired power plants also provide the price-setting units for a
fifth of the hours in the lowest priced third. In fact, gas-fired power plants are price-setting in
lowest priced tercile throughout all modelled countries5. For most countries, this share only
comprises a small percentage of the hours, but they dominate the price setting in this price
segment on the British, Spanish, Portuguese and, to a lesser extent, the Italian market. It
should be noted at this point that those four markets also comprise the markets with the
highest overall price-level by quite a margin. This is the consequence of price-setting gas-fired
power plants.

5

In countries with little or no gas-fired generation capacity, foreign gas-fired power plants provide the price
setting units during those hours.
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Figure 7: Price-setting technologies of the medium priced tercile in per cent

The picture of price-setting technologies changes significantly in the medium-priced segment
(Figure 7). Renewable energies and nuclear power plants are no longer a relevant factor in
terms of providing price-setting units. Gas-fired power plants, reservoirs & pumped-hydro
plants as well as lignite- and coal-fired power plants each provide the price-setting units for
about third of the hours. Again, the share of lignite-fired power plants is higher than that of
coal-fired plants, and gas-fired units dominate the price setting on the British, Spanish,
Portuguese and Italian market. Among Sweden, Finland and Norway it is Norwegian
reservoirs that are setting the price for the great majority of hours.

Figure 8: Price-setting technologies of the highest priced tercile in per cent

In the highest priced tercile, the share of gas-fired power plants as price-setting units
increases further to two fifths of the hours, whilst the share of lignite-fired power plants is
lower than in the other price segments (Figure 8). Only in Eastern Europe does the latter
technology remain a relevant price-setting technology. Coal-fired power plants provide the
price-setting units for one fifth of the hours. As a further point of interest, the share of
reservoirs as price-setting units is slightly lower compared with the medium priced segment.
It seems striking that their share as price-setting units in Sweden, Finland and Norway is lower
than in the medium priced tercile. Furthermore, for some hours in the highest price segment
12
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– albeit very few – there are lignite- and coal-fired power plants providing the price-setting
units in the three countries, despite those technologies not playing a role there in the price
setting in the medium and lowest priced thirds.
A look into prices reveals that Norway, Sweden and Finland represent the three countries
with the lowest general price level and that prices during most hours, even in the highest
priced segment, are not significantly above the marginal cost level of coal-fired power plants.
With respect to the price setting in the Nordic countries, analysts mention the relevance of
German off-peak pricing for Nordic power prices (Loreck et al., 2013, pp. 27–33; Mollestad,
2016). The modelling results do not convey a significant relevance of German off-peak
generation units as price-setting power plants in the Nordics. However, German off-peak
generation may still be relevant in this context, even if it is not providing the price-setting
units directly. During most hours in the Nordics, Norwegian reservoirs set the price as per the
modelling results. However, the marginal costs of these reservoirs are not the decisive factor.
Shadow prices used for the optimisation reflect the marginal costs of the next dispatchable
power plant in the merit order, which in this case can be German coal- or lignite-fired power
plants, once those in Finland and Denmark are exhausted. Hence, German off-peak
generation may still have an influence on the price setting in the Nordic countries, without
providing the actual price-setting units for a significant number of hours.

4.4 Conventional wisdom vs modelling results
Subsequently, there is the question of how the modelling results compare with the
aforementioned conventional wisdom.
First, the modelling results indicate that gas-, lignite- and coal-fired power plants are indeed
setting the price during most hours of year. This dominance is, however, not as clear cut as
conventional wisdom might suggest. Whilst gas-, lignite- and coal-fired power plants provide
the marginal price-setting units for most hours, their share lies below two thirds (Figure 5).
Reservoirs and pumped-hydro power plants provide the last marginal unit for approximately
a quarter of the hours of a year, predominantly in the medium- and high-priced segments.
Nuclear power plants and renewable electricity sources – first and foremost run-of-river
hydro power plants – also provide price-setting units, primarily during low-priced hours.
Generally, the results reflect the merit order of a given country, but according to the results
of the model, the level of interconnectivity in terms of price setting can be high (see Figure
2).
Altogether, the modelling results indicate that the price setting in Europe can be more
complex than conventional wisdom might suggest. It is not incorrect to argue that coal-fired
power plants set the price in times of low demand and gas-fired power plants when demand
is high, but this can potentially disregard the heterogeneity of European power systems and
the interconnectivity of markets.
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5. Application to carbon price floors
Carbon price floors are currently subject to an ongoing debate in academia and the public
sphere. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is characterised by a
comparably low allowances price level; a level scholars generally regard as too low to fulfil
the intended functions of the scheme (Abrell et al., 2016, p. 2; European Commission, 2014;
Rogge et al., 2011). There is an extensive body of literature on the weak performance of the
EU ETS and possible paths to reform, yet policy makers have increasingly looked towards
setting a carbon floor price.
In this vein, the recently formed Dutch government under Mark Rutte (the third Rutte
cabinet) announced its plans to introduce a national carbon price floor for the power sector
starting at 18 EUR/tCO2 in 2020 (Van Veldhoven in Franke, 2017)6. And since becoming French
president, Emmanuel Macron has reiterated his campaign call for a pan-European carbon
price floor (Macron, 2017a). When presenting his oft-reported ‘Initiative for Europe’,
President Macron stated than any price floor below 25-30 Euros per ton of CO2 would not be
effective (Macron, 2017b).
The German approach is far more cautious. The coalition agreement of the new government
(the fourth Merkel cabinet) did call for a CO2 pricing system that was globally oriented; to at
least include the G20 states (Christlich Demokratische Union et al., 2018, p. 143). This call –
deemed unrealistic – was followed by a statement advocating to follow the momentum of
the recent common Franco-German resolution marking the 55th anniversary of the Élysée
treaty, and co-operate in the framework of Franco-German partnership for the
implementation of the Paris climate agreement and the commitments of the “One Planet
Summit” (Christlich Demokratische Union et al., 2018, p. 148).
The common resolution of the German and French parliaments includes a proposal to suggest
common initiatives regarding a CO2 price (Assemblée nationale and Deutscher Bundestag,
2018, p. 10). Nevertheless, the fact that the German coalition agreement fails to mention the
prospect of a national, European or Franco-German CO2 pricing initiative is telling. Optimists
may point towards the subsequent mentioning of the common resolution and argue that it
could be construed as a signal to France that the door might not be fully shut.
Regardless, and despite its comparably slim chances of coming into fruition, this paper will
entertain the idea of a common Pentalateral Energy Forum7 CO2 price floor, next to a sober
analysis of the announced Dutch price floor. Even though the Pentalateral Forum has been
primarily a platform for regional integration towards electricity market integration (i.e.
market coupling) and security of supply, it is assumed in this scenario that the energy
ministers in question would follow Macron’s proposal and take the step for a common CO2
price floor for the power sector.

6

Final details are yet to be disclosed, but Member of Parliament van Veldhoven from the liberal D66 party
announced a starting price of 18EUR/tCO2 which will rise to 43EUR/tCO2 in 2030 (in Franke, 2017).
7
The Pentalateral Energy Forum is an intergovernmental initiative and a framework for regional co-operation
in central Western Europe towards improved electricity market integration and security of supply. It was
created in 2005 by energy ministers from Austria, the Benelux, France, Germany, and Switzerland as
permanent observer (European Commission, 2015; Umpfenbach et al., 2015, p. 9)
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Aside from the potential aforementioned initiatives, there is currently only one active carbon
price floor scheme in the EU that applies to the power sector, which is the British Carbon Price
Floor established in 2013. An issue common to carbon price initiatives is the question of how
to handle electricity imports and exports. In legal terms, any scheme ought to be compatible
with relevant legislation and in particular with WTO law, EU Law and other trade agreements.
Thus far, the only established system (i.e. the British system) disregards electricity imports,
which means power imports from abroad are not charged the carbon price support8. Whilst
subsequent competitive disadvantages for domestic power producers are somewhat limited
in Great Britain due to the comparably low interconnection capacity, the picture might look
different on the continent. Details on the forthcoming Dutch carbon price floor are yet to be
published, yet analysts expect it to follow the British model (Carbon Pulse, 2017; Tijs, 2017).
In this analysis it is therefore assumed that the Dutch carbon price floor as well as the
theoretical Austrian-Benelux-Franco-German-Swiss (Pentalateral Forum) price floor would
function in this manner.

5.1 A Dutch CO2 floor price of 18EUR/tCO2
Market analysts and traders expect the Dutch CO2 price floor to cause production shifts from
the Netherlands to the neighbouring countries. Following the introduction of the price floor
in 2020, Dutch fossil fuel generators will face higher marginal costs and thus have a
competitive disadvantage over their Belgian and German counterparts. This rests of course
upon the assumption that the Dutch price floor will indeed follow the British model in
handling imports (see above). Consequently, analysts expect rising prices in the Netherlands
and increased imports from Germany, Belgium and Great Britain depending on British carbon
policy post Brexit9 (Franke, 2017; Tijs, 2017; Witkop, 2018).
The modelling results confirms this view. Even though the Dutch CO2 price floor of 18 Euros
per ton of CO2 is only a couple of euros higher than the EU ETS future prices at the time of the
modelling, the results show noteworthy developments. Dutch net power imports rise by
almost a quarter. As a result, one notes rising exports from Germany and reduced British
imports from the Netherlands. Average wholesale baseload power prices in the Netherlands
and its neighbours rise marginally; about 30 cents per megawatt hour (MWh) in the
Netherlands, 20 cents in Belgium and 10 cents in France and Germany.
A higher price mark-up than the proposed price floor shows amplified effects. Whilst Dutch
coal- and gas-fired generation decreases by approximately ten and five per cent respectively
at a Dutch carbon floor price of 18 Euros per ton of CO2 compared to the reference scenario,
these numbers do rise to approximately 45 and 15 per cent respectively when a higher carbon
price floor of 30 Euros per ton of CO2 is applied in the Netherlands. In a similar fashion, such
a higher carbon price floor would also result in higher wholesale baseload prices in the
Netherlands and neighbouring countries, as well as considerably larger changes in the import
and export balances. In this case, Dutch power imports would approximately double as Dutch
8

Carbon taxation models looking to charge electricity imports a minimum carbon price are subject to an
extensive legal debate. It is questionable whether border tax adjustments or other measures could be
successfully and legally employed for this purpose (Blume-Werry et al., 2017, p. 12; Holzer et al., 2017, p. 373;
Kreiser et al., 2015, p. 167).
9
In the computations it was assumed that Great Britain will continue to participate in EU ETS.
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coal- and gas-fired generation is replaced: primarily by German, British, Belgian and even
Italian gas-fired generation.
In terms of the price-setting technologies, the effects are negligible. On a country-to-country
basis, the number of hours during which Dutch power plants are price-setting rise due to the
carbon price floor and the subsequently, slightly higher price level. In turn, German and
Belgian plants have slightly less hours during which they provide price-setting units. Of more
significance are the effects of the price floor on carbon emissions. The CO2 emissions of the
conventional Dutch power plant fleet shrink by approximately five per cent as Dutch coal and
gas-fired power plants produce less electricity than in the reference scenario. On a European
level, this reduction is, however, offset by increased emissions elsewhere – in particular in
Belgium, Germany and Poland.
Altogether, the modelling results back the prevailing view. The Dutch carbon price floor would
lead to rising Dutch imports and ergo reduced Dutch emissions, but with little to no emission
reductions on a wider European level (as in most cases Dutch power plants are substituted
with power plants of the same technology elsewhere). With respect to the price-setting
technologies, the general price setting picture stays virtually unaffected by the Dutch carbon
price floor and there are no major shifts taking place.

5.2 The Pentalateral Energy Forum CO2 price floor of 30EUR/tCO2
In a second scenario it is assumed that the countries of the Pentalateral Energy Forum
(Austria, Benelux, France, Germany and Switzerland) introduce a common carbon price floor
of 30 Euros per ton of CO2. The research year remains the same (2020) as in the reference
and Dutch price floor scenario. Given the significantly higher carbon price and the larger pool
of countries introducing the price floor, one would expect considerably more substantial
effects.
The modelling results show that such an initiative would cause wholesale power prices to rise.
Prices in the Benelux and Germany are approximately 2.5€/MWh higher in this scenario
compared with the reference scenario. In the less carbon-intensive power markets of Austria,
France and Switzerland, prices rise by approximately 1.7€/MWh. With regards to the
import/export balance, one can observe notable shifts with Dutch power imports nearly
doubling and Germany turning from a net exporter into a net importer.
Carbon price floors serve the declared target of emission reductions and the modelling results
confirm that the carbon price floor analysed leads to lower emissions in the countries
introducing it and, in this case, also overall at a wider European level. In absolute terms,
emission reductions are most significant in Germany and the Netherlands whilst British, Polish
and Czech power plants increase their output and subsequently their CO2 emissions.
Altogether, the clear emission reductions in the countries of the Pentalateral Energy Forum of whom Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands experience emission reductions of 15-20
per cent – are, unlike in the scenario of the Dutch carbon price floor of 18EUR/tCO2, not fully
offset by rising emissions elsewhere even though emissions in Eastern Europe and in Great
Britain rise significantly.
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It is important to note at this point that the modelling computations disregard EU ETS price
developments originating from the introduction of the carbon price floor. It has been argued
that emission reduction measures in one area or facility will depress demand which in turn
puts downwards pressure on prices and results in subsequent emission increases in another
area or facility (Burtraw et al., 2017, p. 4). One can refer to this as the so-called ‘waterbed
effect’10.
Be that as it may, the carbon price floor leads to a fuel switch in Germany, with running hours
of gas-fired power plants increasing and those of coal- and lignite-fired power plants
decreasing. The modelling results further indicate reduced production volumes of all fossil
generation technologies in the Netherlands and increased outputs of British gas-fired power
plants following the introduction of the carbon price floor in the countries of the Pentalateral
Energy Forum.
With respect to the price-setting technologies, the effects of the carbon price floor are again
small scale or indeed negligible. The results of the model show minimal changes compared
with the reference scenario. It is thus a key finding that even though the marginal costs of
fossil plants, general price level and import and export balances change, the structure of the
price-setting technologies remains very similar. Even though coal-fired power plants, for
instance, provide the price-setting units for slightly less hours in this carbon price floor
scenario than in the reference scenario, the scale of change is too insufficient to observe
important changes.

6. Conclusion
The conventional wisdom holds that in many central European countries, coal- and/or gasfired power plants provide the marginal price-setting units for most hours of the year. The
modelling results confirm that in the countries researched, coal-, lignite- and gas-fired power
plants are indeed price-setting for most hours of the year. Their dominance is, however, not
as clear cut as the conventional wisdom might suggest. The analysis with a fundamental
electricity market model has shown that during hours of low demand, nuclear power plants
and renewables are providing price-setting units for a considerable number of hours
alongside lignite- and gas-fired power plants. Throughout all price segments yet especially
10

Emission reduction measures outside or independent of the EU ETS often face critique related to the
‘waterbed effect’. The coining of the term ‘waterbed effect’ is commonly credited to British economist Paul
Geroski, who described that if prices are pushed up or down on one side of a two-sided market, it can result in
a rebalancing at the other side – just like a waterbed (Genakos and Valletti, 2008, p. 1). As regards the EU ETS,
it has been argued that emission reduction measures in one area or country do not reduce total emissions as
they are set by a fixed cap. To what extent the waterbed effect is actually applicable to the EU ETS and
potential carbon price floors within it is disputed; as is the question of whether total long-term supply of
allowances is fixed and capped or set by future policy decisions (Burtraw et al., 2017; Edenhofer et al., 2017;
Perino and Willner, 2016; Whitmore, 2016). The most recent EU ETS reform enables EU Member States to
voluntarily cancel allowance units following national energy policies that lead to a reduction of their electricity
generation capacity (European Parliament and European Council, 2018). In theory, this paves the way for
national or regional carbon price floors and coal-fired power plant phase-outs as envisaged by some Member
States without risk of the waterbed effect. However, experts remain very sceptical of the (large-scale) use of
this new measure that enables Member States to cancel allowances to counteract the impact of capacity
closures (Edenhofer et al., 2017, p. 9; Ferdinand in Evans, 2017).
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during mid- to high-priced hours, reservoirs and pumped-hydro power stations play a
substantial role in the price setting process. However, one should keep in mind that their
marginal pricing does not reflect the marginal costs, as shadow prices or water values –
reflecting the marginal costs of an additional alternative (thermal) power plants – are used
for the dispatch (see above). In the highest priced segment, gas-fired power plants provide
the price-setting units for the largest share of hours.
Large countries tend to have a strong influence on the price setting in smaller neighbouring
countries, as long as there are sizeable interconnector capacities. More generally, one can
observe a high level of interconnectivity between the countries researched. The price-setting
technologies per country vary significantly depending on the generation portfolio of a given
country and the connected surrounding countries. In Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal and
Spain) and Great Britain, gas-fired power plants dominate the price setting, whilst lignite- and
coal-fired power plants tend to do so in Eastern Europe. Hydro-storage and pumped-hydro
plants provide the price-setting units during most hours in Northern Europe. The most
balanced picture with respect to the price-setting technologies is to be found in central
Europe and the price setting ergo reflects the general generation portfolio.
Two scenarios with different carbon price floors have shown that the general structure of the
price setting remains largely unaffected by the researched carbon price changes. A Dutch
carbon price of 18EUR/tCO2 would lead to reduced Dutch coal- and gas-fired generation and
CO2 output, and subsequently higher electricity imports. Despite these observations, the
changes in the price-setting technologies as a result of the Dutch carbon price are found to
be limited.
One can draw conclusions regarding the scenario of a wider European carbon price floor
encompassing the countries of the Pentalateral Energy Forum in a similar fashion. The carbon
price floor would have a substantial impact on wholesale power prices, fuel switching, CO2
emissions and import/export balances, whilst the general structure of price-setting
technology remains largely the same as in the reference scenario. For Austria, the Benelux,
France, Germany and Switzerland the results show rising power prices, production shifts to
surrounding countries with lower carbon prices and subsequently lower emissions.
Altogether, the analysis contributes to fill the identified gap in the literature. It shows that
price-setting patterns are more complex and nuanced than the conventional wisdom suggests
and that other power generation technologies than coal- and gas-fired power plants provide
more often than one may assume the last marginal price-setting units. In this light, further
research can help to establish a more detailed view on the price setting on European power
markets and how this may change as the decarbonisation of the power sector progresses.
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